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Abstract
Three studies investigated how subliminally primed thoughts of an agent prior to action can aVect ascriptions of authorship for that
action. Participants competed against a computer program to remove words from a computer screen. Participants reported greater feel-
ings of authorship when primed with Wrst person singular pronouns, and lower feelings of authorship when primed with “computer.” We
also investigated whether authorship feelings could be aVected by priming subjects with a supernatural agent (i.e., God). Feelings of
authorship decreased when participants were primed with God, but only among believers.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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When you do something, how do you know you’re the
one who did it? Normally, this doesn’t seem like much of a
mystery, because you can feel yourself doing things and
appreciate the operation of your physical body. But what
happens when the self is not the only agent that might be
responsible for the body’s actions? At times, agents other
than the self are very plausible causes for actions, such as
when your computer crashes and it is not clear whether you
pressed an inappropriate key or whether the computer is to
blame. In addition, at least for some people, there may be
non-self agents present in a mere psychological sense,
potential causal forces that are believed to exist and guide
action—agents such as spirits, angels, Satan, God, or even
the inner voices that accompany delusional states. How do
people sort out the causes of their own actions when they
believe in such agents? These studies explored the idea that
the attribution of authorship for action to self might be
inXuenced by the subliminal priming of particular agents,
and that the inXuence of such priming might depend on the
person’s beliefs in the agent.
Attribution of authorship
The feeling that the self is the author of an action is
derived in part from basic physiological systems of the
body. One knows one is doing something by virtue of inter-
oceptive sensations of the body’s movement (Craig, 2003)
that occur both before action (Frith, Blakemore, & Wol-
pert, 2000) and after action (Gandevia & Burke, 1992).
Such bodily feedforward and feedback systems are supple-
mented by visual and auditory feedback, as we can often
see and hear ourselves act. However, these sensory indica-
tors of authorship for action are often overridden by a
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variety of social and contextual variables that can drive
attributions quite independently of direct sensation (Weg-
ner, 2002; Wegner & Sparrow, 2004). In the case of actions
that do not have obvious bodily sensations, or that are so
distant from their bodily wellsprings as to be diYcult to
trace, the experience of authoring the action may depend
not on sensation, but on processing causal information and
arriving at an attribution judgment (Heider, 1958; Kelley,
1972; Jones & Davis, 1965; Gilbert, 1997).
An early theory of such attribution proposed by Ziehen
(1899) held that thinking of self before action yields the
experience of own agency. He remarked that “ƒwe Wnally
come to regard the ego-idea as the cause of our actions
because of its very frequent appearance in the series of
ideas preceding each action. It is almost always represented
several times among the ideas preceding the Wnal move-
ment. But the idea of the relation of causality is an empiri-
cal element that always appears when two successive ideas
are very closely associated” (Ziehen, 1899, p. 296). The
hypothesis that thoughts of self may incline people to inter-
pret actions as their own was later noted by Michotte
(1963), and was developed yet more fully in the objective
self awareness theory of responsibility attribution (Duval &
Wicklund, 1972; Duval & Silvia, 2001).
Research on attention and causal attribution has shown
that people who are led to attend to themselves become
more likely to attribute responsibility to self for causally
ambiguous events (Duval, Duval, & Neely, 1979; Duval &
Wicklund, 1973), although not always in the case of nega-
tive events (FederoV & Harvey, 1976). More generally,
when attention is drawn to any social entity—self, other, or
group—that entity becomes likely to draw attributions of
causation and responsibility (Arkin & Duval, 1975; Lass-
iter, Geers, Munhall, Ploutz-Snyder, & Breitenbecher, 2002;
McArthur & Post, 1977; Storms, 1972; Taylor & Fiske,
1978; Wegner & Giuliano, 1982). This view of attribution
suggests why actors more often view their behavior as
caused by situations, whereas observers of those actors
view the same behavior as caused by the actors’ disposi-
tions—the diVerence may occur in part because actors are
attending to situations and observers are attending to the
actor (Jones & Nisbett, 1972).
The attentional view of causal attribution also solves an
important problem in how agency judgments are made. The
attention theory suggests that prior thought about an agent
or cause creates a frame for cause perception, a general ten-
dency for agency to be ascribed to the attended agent. Such
a frame or set can explain why it is that attributions of
agency to self are often very Xuid and perfunctory (e.g.,
Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005), occurring with a rapidity
that suggests automatic processing (e.g., Taylor & Fiske,
1978) rather than a thorough information search (e.g., Kel-
ley, 1967). If every event in the world required a full analy-
sis of possible agents, after all, quick judgments of own
agency would seem unlikely. For example, the simple act of
going the kitchen for a midnight snack could throw a per-
son into an attributional crisis if one had to consider the
multiple possibilities that self is doing this, or that others
present are eliciting the action, or perhaps even that absent
others or supernatural agents such as God are prompting
the action. The person would seldom Wgure out who did it
before the snack was all gone. Because people also make
rapid authorship judgments not only for actions but for
their own thoughts—and thoughts are only misattributed
to non-self agents in psychopathology or in unusual cir-
cumstances (Frith et al., 2000; Graham & Stephens,
1994)—it seems there must be a mental system that regu-
larly guides attributions of agency toward a current default
agent.
Past research on causal attribution for own actions has
focused on situational variables that inXuence attention,
such as point of view (e.g., Storms, 1972; Taylor & Fiske,
1978). The default agent for own action must be deter-
mined, however, by mental processes that operate without
such sensory guidance—or we would be mystiWed about
who is doing our thinking and behaving each time we
awake in the dark of night. The system of mind underlying
the experience of authorship for our own actions seems
likely to operate through a cognitive process that “keeps in
mind” a current likely agent for action. This process should
be susceptible to associative priming of information that
serves to remind the person of a particular agent. Such
priming could even ensue from subliminal sources, as con-
scious attention can be guided readily by unconscious
primes (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna,
2002). Self-attributions of authorship may be driven, in
short, by an unconscious authorship processing system
(Wegner & Sparrow, 2004) that can be biased regarding
attributions to particular default agents by associative
priming.
Such automatic, associative priming will generally have
direct eVects on perceived authorship, in that increased
accessibility of an agent will lead to enhanced attribution to
that agent. If the self is more accessible, the possibility that
an action is ascribed to self increases. Likewise, if another
external agent is accessible, attributions to the self become
less likely. For instance, if the concept of “computer” is
primed, a sudden computer failure during a routine mainte-
nance would likely be attributed to the computer itself,
rather than to the technician working it. Both the attention/
attribution model and our authorship processing view are
able to explain such direct eVects.
However, an important virtue of the authorship process-
ing view is that it makes predictions that do not follow eas-
ily from a simple attention/attribution model. The
attention/attribution model predicts inXexibly that
increased attention to or priming of any agent would
enhance attribution to that agent, whereas the authorship
processing view opens a second possibility based on the
assumption that people always keep in mind a default agent
(often the self): a person might think of another agent alter-
natively as a rival for authorship, leading to less attributed
agency to the default agent. For example, priming the con-
cept of “God” may decrease experienced authorship for4 A. Dijksterhuis et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 2–9
behavior among believers, because it rivals with the default
concept of “self” as an author.
Self versus other agents
The belief that agents other than self might inXuence
actions of the body is common in many cultures. Polls indi-
cate that upwards of 95% of people in the USA profess a
belief in God or a universal spirit (Bishop, 1999), and many
believers worldwide ascribe authorship to God for all
things (Boyer, 2001). It is common, too, for people to
ascribe their creative insights (“Eureka experiences”) to
supernatural agents (Ghiselin, 1952). Young children are
also often adept at ascribing events to culturally sanctioned
imaginary agents of other kinds, such as Santa or the Tooth
Fairy (Woolley, 2000), and some have imaginary friends
whom they feel inXuence their actions (Taylor, 1999). Some
individuals with schizophrenia may ascribe actions,
thoughts, or voices to imagined agents inside or outside
themselves (Frith, 1994). And of course, there are a wide
range of occult beliefs involving spirit agents, such as beliefs
in trance channeling (Brown, 1997) and spirit possession
(Bourguignon, 1976). Humans seem to live in a world in
which potentially many non-self agents might potentially
be seen as controlling the body (Guthrie, 1993).
It is remarkable that people should be so willing to make
attributions to agents that they do not physically encoun-
ter, and who leave little evidence of their actions (or their
existence).  Guthrie (1993) argues that the tendency to
anthropomorphize is responsible for religious beliefs; we
attribute agency to supernatural beings and develop reli-
gious beliefs around these agents. People possess a readi-
ness to detect agents (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Heider, 1958;
Heider & Simmel, 1944), an advantage because it allows
them to quickly identify potential threats, mates, and help-
ers. Most people with religious beliefs never see the gods or
spirits they believe in. They expect to see the work of super-
natural agents in everyday events, and so they do.
There may be a connection between the ability to per-
ceive intentional external agents and religious thought
(Barrett, 2000. Boyer (2003) suggests that religious concepts
often revolve around intentional agents that one does not
physically encounter, such as ghosts, spirits, and gods, and
that this is an extension of the human ability to run oV-line
interactions with imagined agents (Povinelli & Preuss, 1995;
Scott, Baron-Cohen, & Leslie, 1999). Bering (2002) suggests
that people turn to intentional forces as a way of making
sense of life events. Impactful events are often seen as some
agent’s attempt to communicate with a person, and to teach
that person important life lessons (e.g., I broke my legs so
that I would value life more). Gilbert, Brown, Pinel, & Wil-
son (2000) found that people seek external agents to explain
fortunate events. People were found to ascribe agency to an
external force when things worked out in their favor, and to
attribute characteristics of benevolence and insight to that
external agent. The agents a person might conceivably hold
responsible for an event, in short, might include not only
self and other real people or physical objects—but also
could include supernatural agents.
The assignment of authorship to agents, both self and
non-self, has been viewed in prior theory as an attribution
problem.  Spilka, Shaver, & Kirkpatrick, 1985) proposed
that the availability of thoughts of God would inXuence
whether believers would make either secular or religious
attributions for events. This hypothesis resembles the atten-
tion theory of attribution, in that it suggests that the
salience of thoughts of God should inXuence attributions of
agency. Although the hypothesis has been evaluated in
some studies, research has not revealed consistent eVects of
availability—Wnding instead a general bias toward attribu-
tions to God for positive as opposed to negative events
(Lupfer, De Paola, Brock, & Clement, 1994). We contend
that attributions to God do not follow directly from mere
attention or salience, but from more the complex processes
of authorship processing. It could be that this inconsistency
derives from variations in the degree to which God as an
agent is seen as a causal alternative to self as agent. For
instance, attributions to God only make sense if the person
making the attributions perceives God as a plausible causal
agent. Therefore, believers who are exposed to thoughts of
God might attribute their own actions to an external source
because God becomes a salient alternative cause (Kelley,
1972), whereas this should not be the case for non-believers.
The study of the attribution of agency to self when peo-
ple have been led through subliminal primes to think of self
or of God, then, provides a context for understanding how
authorship processing follows from diVerent views of how
internal and external agents interact.
The present research
Our experiments examined the inXuence of subliminal
priming of agents on perceptions of the authorship of
action. We designed a paradigm in which the authorship of
a large number of simple actions was ambiguous. Partici-
pants competed against a computer program to remove
words from the screen faster than the computer did, and on
each trial judged whether they had successfully beat the
computer to remove the word. Just before each word was
presented, however, participants were subliminally primed
with a word relating to self, another agent, or a control
word. Thus, immediately before the act, the person was
thinking about either self or another agent. The initial
expectation was that priming of self-related words would
lead to ascription of agency to self, whereas priming of
words suggesting other agents would reduce ascription of
agency to self.
It should be noted that we primed agents subliminally
for two reasons. First, as said before, we believe authorship
processing relies on the mere accessibility of agents, and
does not require conscious awareness. Subliminal priming
has been shown to aVect judgments in a variety of diVerent
domains (for a review see Dijksterhuis, Aarts, & Smith,
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Dijksterhuis (2004) investigated how implicit self-esteem
could be improved by subliminal association of the self and
positive primes. It was found that when self words were
paired subliminally with positive words, participants had
higher implicit self-esteem, as measured by their preference
for letters in their own name. Subliminal priming in
the present studies was used as a way of enhancing the
accessibility of thoughts relevant to speciWc agents (cf.
Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Wegner & Smart, 1997). The
second reason we used subliminal priming is that supralim-
inal priming may render the task odd for participants.
Indeed, participants may become suspicious if they see
diVerent potential agents before each trial.
The experiments began with a focus on natural agents:
self (Experiment 1), and the computer (Experiment 2).
Then, we turned to the analysis of subliminal inXuences of
priming with thoughts of God. We examined how sublimi-
nal priming of God would impact authorship judgments of





Fifteen undergraduate students (11 women and 4 men)
from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated in the
experiment. They received DX. 5 (about 2.5 US dollars) in
return.
Instructions
It was explained that participants had to do a lexical
decision task. A series of letter strings would appear on the
screen and for each of these letter strings participants had
to decide as quickly as possible whether the string was a
word or a nonword. They were asked to decide by pressing
a “word” key (A) or a “nonword” key (6). Pressing a key
removed the letter string from the screen. It was explained
to participants that the computer could remove the letter
string before they had responded so an additional task was
to beat the computer.
Measures and stimuli
Participants completed 72 lexical decision trials and 12
practice trials. Each trial included a 250ms premask
(XXXXXX), a 17ms prime, a 50ms postmask (XXXXXX),
and the target letter string. In half the trials, the target word
was a random letter string (e.g., “gewws”). In the remaining
half, the target word was a short, medium, or high fre-
quency, word (bike, chair, etc.). In the experimental Self-
prime trials, the prime “ik” (I in Dutch) and “mij” (me)
were each used 18 times. The 36 control primes all con-
tained the prime “de” (the). The practice trials did not have
a prime. All primes were evenly divided over the targets so
that half of the experimental primes had a nonword as a
target whereas the other half had a word as a target.
The computer was programmed to remove the letter
string from the screen after participants had pressed the
word/no word key, or at a maximum word time. This maxi-
mum time varied. It was programmed to be 450, 500, 550,
600, 650, or 700 ms, each used on 12 trials and on 2 practice
trials. The range of maximum word times varied because it
allowed for more individual diVerences in mean response
time, and in addition it prevented subjects from judging
responsibility just by some timing heuristic for when the
word was removed.
As a measure of feeling of authorship, subjects were
asked to decide whether it was they themselves or the com-
puter that was responsible for the removal of the letter
string following each trial (“Was it you or was it the com-
puter?”). Responses were made on a six-point scale (1DI’m
sure it was me, 2DI think it was me, 3DIf I would have to
guess I’d say it was me, 4DIf I would have to guess I’d say
it was the computer, 5DI think it was the computer,
6DI’m sure it was the computer). The practice trials were
presented immediately before the actual task to give partic-
ipants a feel for the task.
Results and discussion
Response times
There were no diVerences in response time for diVerent
primes (MD487 ms). Also, the percentage of trials where
participants did indeed beat the computer (80.9%) did not
diVer between diVerent primes.
Feelings of authorship
Reported feelings of authorship were recoded so that
higher scores indicated greater feelings of own authorship.
The mean overall feeling of authorship was calculated for
the word and the nonword trials, and for the experimental
and the control prime. These means were subjected to a
within-subjects analysis of variance. Feeling of authorship
was indeed higher after Self-primes (MD3.83,  SDD.68)
than after control primes (MD3.64,  SDD.74), F(1,14)D
5.02, p<.05, 2D.21.
Experiment 2: Computer primes
In Experiment 1 authorship ascriptions to the self
increased following priming with the self, which provides
evidence that agent-relevant thoughts act as cues in author-
ship processing. As a follow-up, we examined whether feel-
ings of authorship could also be inXuenced by thoughts of
external agents—one that might also be responsible. In
Experiment 2 we tested whether feelings of authorship
might decrease after thoughts of an external agent. As in
Experiment 1, participants performed lexical decision tasks
on a computer. Because the competitor in this task was the
computer, we primed subjects with thoughts of the com-
puter just before action. We expected that thoughts of the
computer would result in greater attributions of authorship
to the computer, and decreased attributions to the self.6 A. Dijksterhuis et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 2–9
Methods
Participants
Thirty people (19 women and 11 men) were recruited
through advertisements in the Psychology Department at
Harvard University. Volunteers received payment of Wve
dollars for participation.
Procedure
Much of the procedure in Experiment 2 was the same as
Experiment 1. Participants were instructed to press the
“word” key (E) when the letter string was a word, and the
“not word” key (O) when it was a nonword. These keys
were labeled for participants. Subjects completed a total of
112 lexical decision trials and 4 practice trials. Each trial
included a 250ms premask (XXXXXX), 15ms exposure to
the prime, 50-ms postmask (XXXXXX), and the target let-
ter string. In half the trials the letter string was a word, in
half the trials the letter string was a nonword. The prime
“Computer” was used on 56 trials. Two diVerent control
primes were each used in 28 trials; the word “Broccoli,” and
a series of lowercase X’s (“xxxxxx”.) We opted to use low-
ercase X’s to maintain the Xickering eVect that was seen on
the other trials. As in Experiment 1, the computer removed
the target letter string if the subject pressed the word/not
word key, or at the maximum word time, whichever came
Wrst. The maximum word times were programmed to be 450,
500, 550, 600, 650, 700 or 750 ms, each used on 16 trials.
Order of trials was generated randomly. The target words
and nonwords were selected randomly from a list for each
trial. As an awareness check, subjects were asked at the end
of the study whether they saw any words appear on the com-
puter screen before the appearance of the target words.
Results and discussion
Response times
There were no diVerences in response time for diVerent
primes (MD500ms). Also, the percentage of trials where
participants did indeed beat the computer (63.4%) did not
diVer between diVerent primes. No subjects reported that
they could detect the subliminal primes before the appear-
ance of the target words.
Feelings of authorship
Reported feelings of authorship were recoded so that
higher scores indicated greater feelings of own authorship.
The mean overall feeling of authorship was calculated for
all trials, and for each speciWc prime. There was an overall
diVerence among the three primes on feelings of authorship,
F(2,28)D5.13, p<.05, 2D.27. Ratings of authorship did
not diVer between the two control primes, F(1,29)D.62, ns,
and so the control trials were collapsed together. Support-
ing our hypothesis, feelings of authorship decreased when
subjects were primed with “Computer” (MD3.87,
SDD.76) as compared with control primes (MD4.05,
SDD.89, F(1,29)D7.89, p<.01, 2D.21).
Experiment 3: God primes
In Experiment 2 we found that priming thoughts of a
competing agent prior to an action decreased attributions
to the self and increased attributions to the competitor.
Together with Experiment 1, this provides evidence that
agent-relevant thoughts inXuence authorship processing
such that attributions are consistent with the agent-relevant
thoughts one has before action.
In the following experiment, we were interested in whether
thoughts of supernatural agents might also aVect authorship
processing. God is an external agent, and so thoughts one has
about God before action should decrease attributions to the
self for that action. As argued in the Introduction, our
authorship processing view entails that people will have a
default agent accessible (generally self) and priming a poten-
tial rival agent will reduce experienced authorship. It is
important to note that this does not necessarily have to coin-
cide with explicit awareness of increased agency for this rival
agent. In our computer task, which is the same as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, we will not ask participants whether it was
them or God who took the word from the screen. The sug-
gestion of such as explicit attribution to God would be pre-
posterous for almost all people. Instead, we ask participants,
as we did in the earlier studies, whether it was them or the
computer. Given that the self is the default agent in the para-
digm we used (the agency scores are generally leaning
towards the “self” end of the scale) and assuming that God is
seen as a plausible rival to the self (and not to a computer),
we predict that priming God will reduce authorship.
However, authorship attributions can only be made to
agents that are capable of creating the action. If a person
does not believe God to be a capable agent, she will not
alter her attributions based on thoughts about God. In con-
clusion, Experiment 3 tested two hypotheses: First, that
priming participants with the word “God” would decrease
attributions made to the self. Second, that this eVect is mod-
erated by belief in God, with diVerences in attributions to
the self occurring only among believers.
Methods
Participants
Fifty-Wve undergraduate students (41 women and 14
men) from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated
in the experiment. They received DX. 5 (about 2.5 US dol-
lars) in return.
Measures and stimuli
The same instructions and procedure from Experiment 1
were used. Participants completed 72 lexical decision trials
and 12 practice trials. In the 36 experimental God prime tri-
als, the prime “God” was used. The 36 control primes all
contained the prime “de” (the). The practice trials did not
have a prime. All primes were evenly divided over the tar-
gets so that half of the experimental primes had a nonword
as a target whereas the other half had a word as a target.A. Dijksterhuis et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 2–9 7
At the very end of the experimental session we asked
participants whether they believed in God. The experimen-
tal session contained other experiments that were adminis-
tered between the current experiment the question about
belief in God, so that the question about belief was asked
35–45min after participants performed the main task. We
simply asked them “Do you believe in God?” and they were
requested to either press a “yes” key or a “no” key. Twenty
participants indicated they did believe in God, whereas 35
indicated that they did not.
Results and discussion
Response times
There were no diVerences in response time for diVerent
primes (MD492 ms). Also, the percentage of trials where
participants did indeed beat the computer (80.1%) did not
diVer between diVerent primes or between believers and
non-believers.
Feelings of authorship
The mean overall feeling of authorship was calculated
for the experimental God and the control prime. These
means were subjected to a 2 (belief in God: Yes versus
No)£2 (prime: God versus Control) mixed analysis of var-
iance. The main eVect for Belief was signiWcant,
F(1,53)D4.45,  p<.05,  2D.08, however, this eVect was
qualiWed by the two-way interaction, F(1,53)D5.49, p<.05,
2D.10. As expected, participants indicated less authorship
after being primed with God, but this eVect was only
obtained for believers. Compared to authorship after con-
trol primes, believers experienced less authorship after God
primes, F(1,53)D4.14, p<.05, 2D.07. Furthermore, for the
non-believers the control prime and God prime conditions
did not diVer on authorship, F(1,53)D1.43ns. Means are
shown in Table 1.
The results of Experiment 3 supported our predictions.
Among believers, people felt decreased authorship when
primed with God. This was not so for non-believers, who
were unaVected by the God prime.
It should be noted that we assessed whether participants
believed at the end of the experiment. We did this because
we did not want to draw attention to belief in God prior to
the computer task in which we subliminally primed God.
However, one could argue that the computer task may have
aVected the answers participants gave on the belief ques-
tion. This is unlikely though. First, the priming of God was
subliminal and therefore very subtle. Indeed, participants
were unaware of the prime. Second, we addressed the belief
question only after a 35–45min interval.
General discussion
The results of these studies provide evidence that sublim-
inally primed thoughts about particular agents before an
action impact the ascription of authorship for that action.
In Experiment 1, subliminal primes of the self that were
given before an action increased the personal feeling of
authorship for that action. In Experiment 2, the feeling of
authorship decreased after subjects were subliminally
primed with the computer, an agent also capable of per-
forming the target action. In Experiment 3, we found that
feeling of authorship decreased when people were sublimi-
nally primed with God, a supernatural agent who could
perform the target action. However, this was only the case
for people who believe in God; non-believers did not diVer
in their feeling of authorship between primes.
There are several issues that should be addressed in the
interpretation of these results. As we mentioned before, one
issue concerns the possibility that the results obtained in
Experiments 1 and 2 reXect a semantic priming eVect
(Neely, 1991) rather than an agent priming eVect. Priming
subjects with the word “computer” or the word “Me”
might aVect their preferences for responses that contain
these target primes, regardless of their personal feelings of
authorship. However, we obtained evidence for an agent
priming eVect in Experiments 3, in which the experimental
prime word “God” was not seen in the measure of author-
ship attribution. This shows that there is more than seman-
tic priming at work in these cases.
Another issue with the interpretation of these data is
whether our manipulation might have aVected actual
authorship of action, rather than just the feeling of doing. If
we impacted actual authorship through these subliminal
primes, making people faster or slower on the lexical deci-
sion tasks, it would seem only reasonable that the partici-
pants’ feelings of authorship be adjusted accordingly.
However, the primes had no eVect on either the partici-
pants’ response time or actual success at beating the com-
puter. This suggests that the feeling of authorship can be
relatively independent of actual authorship in these studies,
or at least that there is more to the feeling of authorship
than genuine authorship.
It should be noted that there are potential boundary con-
ditions for the eVects we observed. Ambiguity is a prerequi-
site for the eVects to occur. Someone who is fully convinced
that a hurricane is caused by God (to punish a society), will
probably not change his mind after being primed with an
agent (God or other). However, the behavior participants
performed in our experiments was not only ambiguous in
terms of agency, but also relatively unimportant and neither
very positive nor very negative. The eVects we obtained may
be attenuated for behaviors that are very important and con-
sequential, at least in part because such behavior is often
(though not necessarily always) not ambiguous. In addition,
Table 1
Feelings of authorship as a function of prime and belief in Experiment 3
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Means with diVerent superscripts diVer signiWcantly.
Prime
Control God
Believers 3.63a (1.30) 3.05b(1.42)
Non-believers 3.72a (1.24) 4.01a(1.03)8 A. Dijksterhuis et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 2–9
the degree of positivity or negativity of ambiguous behavior
may introduce a potential bias. We are inclined to attribute
positive behavior more to the self, and negative behavior to
external agents (e.g., FederoV & Harvey, 1976). This implies
that eVects of agency priming will be attenuated for
extremely positive or negative behavior, because there is less
room to maneuver. If very positive behavior leads to a strong
feeling that the self is doing it, activating the self subtly may
make little diVerence. These are speculations though, and fur-
ther research may address such potential moderators related
to the kind of behavior under consideration.
It is interesting to further scrutinize the Wndings of
Experiment 3. We found that, among believers, priming
God led to decreased experienced agency. The authorship
processing view we propose can explain this Wnding with
the assumption that heightened accessibility of an agents
reduces the attribution to the default agent. In concrete
terms, heightened accessibility of God reduced attribution
of an action to the self, for believers at least. We would like
to emphasize though, that we used the concept of “God”
merely as a highly useful example of an external agent. The
authorship processing view predicts that the eVects can be
generalized to other external agents.
The null results found for non-believers on God primes
points to the importance of the perceived eYcacy of a
potential agent. It could have been the case that authorship
processing is always consistent with any agent-relevant
thoughts before action. For example, if I think about my
Aunt Jean in Colorado before I bowl a strike in Connecti-
cut, I could think she had done it, or if I look in the mirror
before Ruud van Nistelrooij scores for Holland in the
World Cup Soccer, I could think I had done it. Such attri-
butions would not only be wrong, but completely absurd.
Agent-relevant thoughts that occur before action should
impact authorship processing only if that agent is perceived
to be capable of that action. Thus, thinking about myself
before a winning goal could increase attributions to myself
if I am a player in the game, but not if I am watching it on
television. For the same reason, people who did not believe
in God were not impacted by the God primes, because God
was not believed to be an agent.
The role of perceived agent eYcacy could be examined in
future studies. For example, if we had asked subjects about
their attitudes on the omnipotence of God, we might have
found that the eVects were mediated by how powerful God
was believed to be. In a similar vein, self-primes should
have less authorship in those who have lower self-esteem,
because these people should have less conWdence in their
own abilities. In fact, recent evidence points at this possibil-
ity. Self-primes led to lower rather than higher feelings of
agency among dysphoric participants (Aarts, Wegner, &
Dijksterhuis, 2006).
In addition to these general beliefs about the eYcacy of
various agents, a person may have a general tendency to per-
ceive a particular agent as the most likely author, across
many situations. For example, a person who had strong
beliefs in God and His omnipotence could be more likely to
judge Him to be responsible for actions (even in the absence
of our subliminal primes). It seems likely that all people have
some sort of agent framing that is their baseline in making
authorship attributions. If the cues used in authorship pro-
cessing are shortcuts to making these judgments, then agent
framing is the map we use to draw those shortcuts.
In activities that one is directly involved, (e.g., playing a
soccer game), the default agent frame may be the self.
Research on locus of control has shown that people vary in
the extent to which they perceive actions to be within their
control, and the extent to which they are willing to make
internal attributions for an outcome (Rotter, 1966; Seligman,
1975). Indeed, the results from the present studies suggest
that most people have a general tendency to attribute author-
ship to the self when the self may be implicated; for all primes
in all studies, attributions of authorship leaned more toward
the self than the computer. However, the self is only one kind
of agent frame that a person could use. The plane crash in
Queens (NY) in November 2001 and the blackout in August
2003 that aVected 50 million people in the United States and
Canada had many people immediately thinking that terror-
ists had struck again. Many forms of paranoia also involve
some agent frame, such as suspicions of government conspir-
acy or delusions of alien inXuence.
Agent frames may vary between people, but they are
only a baseline for authorship processing. If such cues
become more frequent over time, we could expect that the
agent frame might shift to a diVerent baseline. Several per-
sonal failures can make a person less prone to attribute
authorship to the self, and several successes could promote
the tendency to attribute agency to the self. Evidence from
this study points to the temporary malleability of those
agent frames by external cues and new information, in par-
ticular that they are inXuenced by agent-relevant thoughts,
and are consistent with those thoughts.
Conclusion
The authorship of an action is not always clear, but sev-
eral kinds of cues aid a person in judging who is responsi-
ble. In the present research, subliminal primes of the self
before an action increased feelings of personal authorship
for that action, subliminal primes of the competitor (com-
puter) decreased feelings of own authorship, whereas sub-
liminal priming of the inapplicable term Broccoli left felt
authorship unaVected. When we extended the investigation
to include supernatural agency, we found that subliminal
primes of God decreased feelings of personal authorship, as
had primes of the computer. However, this eVect appeared
only for those who believe in God. This is evidence that
authorship attributions are inXuenced by agent-relevant
thoughts, and are consistent with those thoughts, and that
agent-relevant thoughts that a person has prior to action
are one cue that is used during authorship processing. Gen-
uine authorship for an action may not always be clear, so
we rely on our thoughts as clues to discerning the most
likely actor.A. Dijksterhuis et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 2–9 9
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